Tremendous insights here, even without bringing in the implicit corollaries from psychology and game theory. When designing games, or markets, or any sort of constrained evolutionary algorithm, *what is being optimized for* is not immediately clear - indeed, oftentimes it is necessary to observe the outcomes in order to understand the internal dynamics of the imposed ruleset.
This analysis immediately suggests to me 2 optimizations that may become in tension with one another - first, ensure maximal stability to ensure the game remains iterable.
However, this may function in a small-c conservative, sclerotic fashion, as the bureaucratic machinery must be sufficiently resistant to table-flipping. Might this create a tension with the efficacy, or at least agility, of state capacity?
Interesting to contrast the thoughts here with Yarvin's plaintive piece regarding government inertia released only hours ago.
Tremendous insights here, even without bringing in the implicit corollaries from psychology and game theory. When designing games, or markets, or any sort of constrained evolutionary algorithm, *what is being optimized for* is not immediately clear - indeed, oftentimes it is necessary to observe the outcomes in order to understand the internal dynamics of the imposed ruleset.
This analysis immediately suggests to me 2 optimizations that may become in tension with one another - first, ensure maximal stability to ensure the game remains iterable.
However, this may function in a small-c conservative, sclerotic fashion, as the bureaucratic machinery must be sufficiently resistant to table-flipping. Might this create a tension with the efficacy, or at least agility, of state capacity?
Interesting to contrast the thoughts here with Yarvin's plaintive piece regarding government inertia released only hours ago.
Yeah bureaucracy seems conservative.
Brittleness might be stable for a while yet lack resilience when the inevitable transition comes